At NATO, No Time for Cold Feet
1
16:55, by Bruce P. Jackson, «Washington Post» — Politics
For centuries, the Balkans and Europe’s East have deserved their reputations for igniting wider European wars and have given to European history the place names of genocide and mass starvation. In 1949, what the creation of NATO did was to secure the peace in Western Europe after World War II.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has played a transformational role in building a second peace, this time in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, what NATO can do is lay the foundation for a third European peace, this time in the Balkans, and to open a dialogue with the democracies in Europe’s East, thereby setting the stage for a fourth European peace, a more constructive relationship between Europe and Russia.
The transatlantic allies face two critical questions in Bucharest. The first is whether to invite Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to join NATO, a decision that is the culmination of a fifteen-year effort to end the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. The second decision is what relationship Ukraine and Georgia will have with NATO in the turbulent early years of their development— specifically, whether they will be set on a course that allows the possibility of eventual NATO membership or whether they will be excluded.
There are doubters on both. In the Balkans, critics say that Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are not yet ready for NATO membership. Farther east, critics worry about the fragility of democratic institutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and they have concerns about the effect of NATO engagement with those countries on relations with Russia and on European publics skittish about further enlargement of the European Union.
These objections do not bear scrutiny. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have spent more than eight years in rigorous preparation for NATO membership. Today, Croatia has the most impressive economic performance, and real estate prices, of any country in Southern Europe. In recent years, Albania has contributed more soldiers to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and international peacekeeping than most NATO allies. And, since the end of the Balkan wars in 1999, Macedonia has covered more ground in building an integrated, multi-ethnic society than any European nation in such a short time. Taken together, we have a chance to bring a Catholic Croatia, a secular Islamic Albania, and a multi-ethnic Orthodox Macedonia into the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. Not bad.
Of course, these countries have more to do economically and politically. Historically, however, we have never had cause to regret an expansion decision. Imagine if we had waited until Greece and Turkey had completed their internal debates before inviting them to join NATO.
Any further delay on the candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will weaken regional stability just as Kosovo begins its extended period of supervised independence and will confuse and undercut the European Union as it takes over chief security responsibilities from the United States and NATO throughout the region. An inability to close this chapter in the Balkans will also dangerously slow our engagement in Europe’s East.
The second challenge, defining our interest in the success of Ukraine and Georgia, is even more straightforward. These countries are not asking for NATO membership, although they would be delighted if we would treat them as prospective members. They are asking for the tools with which to complete their reforms and ultimately to qualify for membership consideration. NATO has a pre-school program for countries like this called the Membership Action Plan.
It must be forthrightly acknowledged that despite the astounding pace of reform since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia stumbled last November when it cracked down on an opposition demonstration. Likewise, despite the vibrant political pluralism in Ukraine and repeated free and fair elections, it sometimes seems that Kyiv cannot reach a political decision without a fist fight in the Parliament, Constitutional Court or, just last week, in the National Security Council. But these are the familiar juvenile delinquencies of young democracies finding their way in the post-Soviet world. Helping them past this early fragility is in fact an important reason they should be offered a collaborative relationship with NATO.
The Membership Action Plan offers no guarantee of future membership in NATO, let alone in the EU. To be precise, it initiates an open-ended process that anticipates Georgia and Ukraine will spend many years resolving critical national questions of stability, territorial integrity, institutional capacity and the resolution of frozen conflicts before making a political decision to pursue NATO membership. Nor are Russia’s interests in any way injured by closer relations between NATO and Russia’s neighbors. Over time, Ukraine and Georgia will become more stable and undoubtedly more prosperous. Invariably, countries in the process of building closer relations with NATO find that they can safely demilitarize and devote more of their energies to multilateral resolution of conflicts with neighbors. Ultimately, closer relations between Europe and Ukraine and Georgia will bring Russia closer to Europe and will make the needed dialogues with Russia on democracy and energy that much easier.
The third European peace is within reach and the fourth can be set on course with timely action at the Bucharest Summit If, instead, we temporize, we will cast doubt on what America stands for and on the strength and unity of the Europe that is being built before our eyes.
Bruce P. Jackson is the President of the Project on Transitional Democracies. He was the President of the US Committee on NATO from 1995 to 2005.
