Andrei Sannikov: Open Europe for Belarusian citizens

Do not cooperate with the dictator and do not try to educate him.

The leader of the European Belarus civic campaign and 2010 presidential candidate Andrei Sannikov stated that in an interview to Belsat TV channel.

- Can we expect that after Iryna Khalip was freed from serving her term, they would release MIkalaj Statkievich and other political prisoners?

- I do not discuss or comment on that. The lives of political prisoners is not a subject for a totalizator that media creates from time to time. I know how painfully the reaction to this behind the bars.

- The European Union allegedly has taken a tough position on that issue, however has not stopped the economic cooperation with the regime completely. Is it a sign that Brussels has completely gave Belarus to the Moscow’s sphere of influence?

- I wouldn't say that: there is the Eastern Partnership. I am quite skeptical as to what happens in the framework of this program, but it can be regarded as an intention of the European Union to pay attention to our countries. So one cannot say that Belarus was given up to Moscow. This actually was happening at the start of our independence, when the United States and Europe were guided by the principle «Russia first», and then all the rest. It is another thing that the European Union has not yet found instruments to efficiently oppose the advance of dictatorship in the large region of the former USSR. It is exactly this advance that Kremlin supports today.

- What was the first feeling, when Lukashenka was elected in 1994?

- The feeling was that it would mean a disaster for the country. Although, a friend of mine was in Lukashenka’s team and he assured me that everything would be under control: “Do not worry: we will rule, not him”. For what I know this is what Viktar Hanchar counted on too.

- When was the most convenient moment to restrain Lukashenka and push Belarus’ history into a completely different direction? You repeatedly said that the West had lost it.

- The year of 1996. The European Union has frozen the relations with Belarus and that was it. They should have applied a more active policy. There already were political prisoners – Khadyka and Siuchyk. What could have been done? The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus was signed, and it was signed by Lukashenka. This was an instrument to influence the situation in Belarus. More serious observation of the elections should have been demanded. It was clear that there would be falsifications, since two referenda had already took place with violations. The Supreme Council was legitimate. It was recognized – it was a unique fact – by the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, which not only the European Union is a part of, but Russia too. They could have acted using its instruments.

Then there was the year of 1999, a tragic year in our history. A tougher Europe’s reaction could have been in appropriate after that. But it was only in 2004, when the report on the disappeared came out…

There were no reasons for starting the procedure of recognizing Lukashenka’s “parliament” after the 2000 elections. I know that boycott took place then. I even remember the Belarusian TV saying that in the regions – Homiel, Viciebsk – the elections were not valid. Then in the morning everything changed, and the newscasters started saying that the elections were valid.

- During the 2010 electoral campaign you repeatedly said that Belarus’ priority along with the integration with the European Union should be cooperation with Russia. Since then Moscow has rapidly moved further into authoritarianism. How are you going to build relations with Putin?

- Before the 2010 elections signals came from the president of Russia, it was Dmitry Medvedev at the moment, as to the strategy and modernization policy. They were not very distinct, but in several of his speeches he mentioned general modernization – not only economic, not only technological, but also political. This was what we could speak with Russians about, since modernization meant the West and Europe. I am not naïve, I did not think it would become Russia’s strategic line, but there were certain hopes.

One should not expect any voluntary democratization in Russia in the nearest future. But we will have to build the relations. Even today it is necessary to highlight what is already evident for everyone, very simple things: Belarus needs changes, and for you Lukashenka is as unpredictable partner as he is for the European Union, to put it simpler – he is not a partner at all. No agreements work with him.

- Why Kremlin did not react in a different way during the 2010 elections and the dramatic events that followed?

- Russia does not have a policy towards Belarus, which looks into the future. One could not hope that Moscow would take the opposition’s side. Anyway we created certain opportunities for some talks to start. But Kremlin used this opportunities to increase the pressure on Lukashenka, to push him into signing the agreements on trade and economic issues and end up in the situation in which they had been before: the dictator would not comply with anything.

I believe, there was a moment, one of the most critical, there was a favorable situation for something to change in Belarus, - when we were in prison. Let’s remember, that Russia actually did not have any relations with Lukashenka for eight months, did not provide any loans. Had Europe taken a more active position, the situation could have changed. There was a political crisis in Belarus, it was a difficult situation for the regime. Europe could have put forward the question of Lukashenka’s legitimacy in a tougher way. Then Russian would have seen the situation differently. But the European Union failed to take the respective decision.

- Can Russian prepare a new candidate for the president of Belarus?

- Russian does not need a democratic leader in Belarus. Let’s remember what Russian did when Shushkievich was dismissed. Nothing. Then they had a democrat Eltsin. I even know that he did that on purpose, did not support Shushkevich, because there is a stereotype in Russia that whoever comes to power in Belarus would immediately go West, join NATO and would threaten Russia. This is last century’s logic, Soviet logic.

- May be for European businessmen, who are close to politicians, it is more convenient to work with the Belarusian regime, than with a democratic Belarus?

- There are such people, but they are not in majority. The major part of businessmen simply do not go to Belarus. I speak with European entrepreneurs, and the interest in Belarus is very high. But large business does not risk entering Belarus’ market. Another thing is the business, which is ready to break the laws. A dictatorship is quick money. But we see that these scandals break out with offshores, banks and business hijacking. One should expect trials of businessmen, who worked in Belarus and Russia, violating the laws of their own countries.

Negative tendencies in stock markets were observed after the sentence passed on Navalny. This is an indicator that an attack on democracy greatly influences trade and economic relations. Russia is more connected with the West, more interested in not breaking these relations. The West has more influence on Russia. So far, unfortunately, it does not use it, ignores the moments, when not only statements should be made, but measures taken.

At the same time I am sure that first of all the Belarusian issues should be solved, then one can hope for a sooner resolution of the situation in Russia.

- Should be solved how?

 - Open Europe for the citizens of Belarus, relieve the people from the obligation to pay so much for visas! Do not cooperate with the dictator and do not try to educate him. He has been proving it impossible for 19 years. The sanctions against business brought their results, due to them me and my friend Dzmitry Bandarenka were released. Russian business started looking at our situation differently: why would I seize Belarusian enterprises if they might end up sanctioned?

- How will Europe be able to issue such a number of visas? The Poles already complain that the Belarusian government does not allow them to increase the number of consuls.

- Poland is not the only European country with an embassy in Belarus. If Europe makes such a decision, all the embassies will follow it. Center for issuing Schengen visas can even be created.

- While being behind the bars, did you think of what you had done wrong at the Square? Could the situation have been saved in order to escape such a number of victims?

- I think that the year of 2010 is the most successful electoral campaign of the opposition exactly for the reason that there were several candidates. We managed to demonstrate that Lukashenka could by no means get 50% in the first round. As to planning… If we return to 2001 and 2006, we know there were planning attempts, but the teams of the single candidates were well controlled by special services.

In 2010 there also were those, who deliberately worked for KGB, but this almost did not create obstacles for the campaign. Then during the interrogations I understood that they did not know what to expect. We put the accent on demonstrating people’s desire to support an alternative candidate. This was a success already at the signature collection stage. I was disappointed that the majority of Europeans did not count on the opposition’s challenging the dictator so strongly. They thought, that Lukashenka would not use force, and were ready to recognize him. I also hoped for international observers, who in private conversations promised to cover more polling stations at the counting stage. Lukashenka did not win at any of those, where they could observe.

- What if there had been a second round?

- That is it, the current regime would have no longer been there.

- Even if Lukashenka had gotten 45% and you – 43%?

- It is impossible, it is a law. When people see that opposition, an alternative is winning – that is it. It was the same with Lukashenka in 1994, by the way. He perfectly knows it. That is why it was obvious that he would not allow for a second round to happen.