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Abandoning of values will not bring stability

Abandoning of values will not bring stability
Maksym Khylko

We cannot allow for the pragmatism of the Eastern Partnership to be carried out by substitution of the goals and rejection of values.

Article of Maksym Khylko, well-known Ukrainian analyst, Head of the Board of East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, specially for charter97.org:

Seven years of the Eastern Partnership - half the success or half the failure?

Seven years after the decision of the European Commission to support the project of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and publication of the relevant press release on 3 December 2008, politicians and experts in the EU and in the partner countries are wondering about the success of this initiative. The main arguments of the optimists are as follows: signed association agreements with three of the six parties in the EP - Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; visa-free regime with Moldova and Georgia and Ukraine's progress towards visa liberalization. At the same time, skeptics remind us of the lack of progress in authoritarian Azerbaijan and Belarus, the failure of the signing of the association agreement with Armenia, Russian aggression against Ukraine in response to its European choice.

To objectively evaluate the achievements and failures of the Eastern Partnership, we should take into account both the limitations of its instruments, which exclude such an important incentive as the prospect of membership, and the overall security situation in the region, which had a tendency to deterioration even before the EaP. Let's be honest: the EU failed to surround itself with a zone of stability and prosperity through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP); and against the background of developments in North Africa and the Middle East, the Eastern Partnership, as a component of the ENP, does not seem a failure.

The union of 16 countries from completely different regions in the framework of the general policy of the ENP was initially deprived of flexibility, and if not for the creation of the EaP, the present successes in its relations with six Eastern European countries would hardly be achieved. That's why the short answer to the question about the success of the Eastern Partnership is probably yes. As, however, the answer to the question whether it was possible to achieve more, showing greater persistence and determination in the pursuit of common European values ​​and interests, and using more efficient tools and differentiated approach.

Differentiation or weakening of the value approach?

The need to develop a differentiated approach in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy in general and the Eastern Partnership in particular is obvious. But the difficulty is that each party has its own vision of this very differentiation.

Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which set a goal of membership in the European Union, already at the Riga Summit in May 2015 offered a differentiation depending on the European integration ambitions and achievements of the participating countries of the Eastern Partnership. This somehow resembles the proposals for multi-speed integration, increasingly heard in the framework of the European Union: those who want to and can integrate more closely must be able to work in the accelerated program, others do not interfere with them, moving on their own schedule.

Authoritarian regimes in Azerbaijan and Belarus perceive the idea of ​​differentiation as a kind of menu from which they can choose only what they like. At a meeting with EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn in April 2015 Aliaksandr Lukashenka clearly expressed his wish to "reformat" the Eastern Partnership, moving from "conventional politics ... to a closer cooperation, based on the solution of economic problems." Simply put - it meant they were ready to work together to earn money, use European loans and technology, while leaving aside questions of democratization, human rights, and other political component.

The story with Armenia was special, because it planned to sign the association and the free trade area agreement with the EU, but, intimidated by Moscow, in 2013 decided not to initial the document and announced the initiation of the accession to the Customs Union of Russia. Under the threat of war with Azerbaijan, it is not easy to reject the proposal of the Russian Federation, supplying arms to both conflicting parties. Even more so, because the EU was not in a hurry to help its eastern partners to defend the right of a foreign policy choice - either in the case of Armenia or in the case of Ukraine.

In September 2015, it became known that Armenia appreciated the suggestion of the EU to develop a new agreement for Yerevan and Minsk, that would be less ambitious than the association agreement. The question is, what will be excluded from the agreement, in addition to customs exemptions, and how the EU even plans to differentiate the relations with the eastern partners.

In the press-release on the revision of the European Neighborhood Policy, presented by Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn on November 18, 2015, stabilization is called "a major political priority", and differentiation, and a large proportion of mutual participation are called "the key elements of the new ENP, knowing that not all partners are working to meet the rules and standards of the EU, and reflecting the wishes of each country on the nature and focus of the partnership with the European Union. " The same document states that "the human rights and democracy will continue to be on the agenda of our political dialogue with all partners in mutually agreed formats."

The appearance of the references in the press release to the "mutual agreement of formats" of the discussion of human rights and democracy, as well as "understanding" of the reluctance of some partners to comply with the rules and standards of the EU raises concerns about the trade-offs that the EU is ready to make for the sake of the proclaimed priority of stabilization. Noncompliance with which standards is the EU ready to "understand"? Is it about the democracy, human rights, the market economy? How do the European officials see the formats of democracy discussions, "mutually agreed" with authoritarian regimes?

The pseudo-pragmatism and imaginary stability

In the context of the migration crisis, the problems with Greece, uncertainty with Britain and strained relations with Russia, there is nothing surprising in the desire of the EU leaders to have even a small respite and stabilization. There is nothing wrong in the intent to 'pragmatize' the neighborhood policy - if it is about finding more efficient and effective ways of its implementation.

The question is, what exactly European officials responsible for the formation of the Neighborhood Policy mean by stability and pragmatism. If by the stability implied a willingness to close our eyes to violations of human rights in authoritarian countries of the ENP and EaP with the hope that local regimes will not allow the revolution, it would be not only a challenge to the European values, but false hope to "buy" the stability at such a high price.

The stability of authoritarian regimes is difficult to predict -- the Arab Spring and Ukraine's Euromaidan events vividly demonstrated it. The regimes of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi and Viktor Yanukovych seemed unshakable to Europeans, even just before their collapse. The day before the flight of Yanukovych, European ministers urged the Ukrainian opposition to make concessions and agree to the promises of the authorities, who clearly did not intend to fulfill them.

Do the EU leaders have these illusions about the authoritarian regime in Belarus now? Are they sure of the correct understanding of the attitudes of the Belarusian people, in the absence of objective data of opinion polls? Isn't it more pragmatic to stimulate the movement of the countries to democracy rather than to invest in support of authoritarian regimes, the stability of which no one can guarantee?

Developing pragmatic policy requires not retreat from the values, but a sober assessment of the situation and choosing the right tools for the effective achievement of the set goals. There will not be any stability in Europe in the near future in any case, including as a result of errors committed in the recent past by all the leading players. The question is, with what result will Europe come out of the present instability strip -- divided and devoid of value basis, or strong and in solidarity.

Individual programs, not individual requirements

Differentiation of relations under the neighborhood policy should not mean bracketing issues of democracy and human rights. Giving up on values ​​will not bring the desired stability, it will not be well perceived by its own population, will not be forgiven by the neighboring nations, which are still deprived of their fundamental rights and freedoms. Disappointment in European values ​​will increase the appeal of radical movements in Europe and beyond -- including religious and national ones; revanchist mood will get a new impetus. Accordingly, there will increase the risks of terrorist threats and of territorial and ethnic conflicts, including within the borders of the European Union.

It is hardly necessary to abandon the principle of 'more for more', which in the press release on the ENP reform is called not strong enough incentive for the formation of commitment to reform in the countries, "with no political will for this." Keep in mind that the decision to abandon the principle of "more for more" in relation to some countries would be a strong demotivator for other members of the ENP and EaP.

Yes, each country can get a personal approach, its own schedules and pace of cooperation, but there must not be different purposes and requirements with regard to democracy and human rights. And the "more for more" approach here could not be better: more democracy - more investments and loans, more human rights - more economic co-operation, more technology.

Increased motivation instead of departing from principles

It's not European values that are really slowing down performance and Eastern Neighborhood policy, but limited motivation. Huge reforms necessary for association agreements and free trade zone are comparable to the requirements previously put forward by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as the requirement for EU membership.

Although the Eastern Partnership has never been offered as a tool for integration, it should not be an alternative to it -- this is how the EaP is perceived by some members of the European Union. It is also the reason why the countries of Eastern Europe are not put beyond the ENP common with North African and Middle Eastern neighbors, although the latter are not eligible for membership in the European Union on a geographical basis.

The prospect of membership, and visa-free regime could be the main motivators of reforms in the Eastern Partnership countries. The prospect of membership gives a clear goal, and the visa-free regime - an opportunity to see what to strive for. The paradox is that Article 49 of the EC Treaty gives the right to any European country that shares the values ​​of democracy and respects human rights, to apply for membership in the European Union.

However, for many European politicians the theme of the membership prospects of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and especially Belarus and Armenia is like a taboo. Russian propaganda skillfully uses this factor to convince the inhabitants of these countries that the EU considers them pseudo europeans for whom the alternative to Russian integration initiatives can only mean staying in the "gray" zone between Russia and the EU. Would Armenia have rejected the Association Agreement, if it had a clear vision of its European integration prospects? Would Belarusians agree to tolerate authoritarianism and semi-colonial status, if they were sure that there is another alternative?

Recognition of the right to apply for membership does not cancel the need for a preliminary implementation of all relevant requirements and does not establish a specific timetable, so it does not carry risks for the EU. The same is true about the visa-free regime with the European countries of the Eastern Partnership, as the abolition of visas does not abolish border controls.

Mobility has been declared one of the priorities of the Eastern Partnership, but is still artificially limited by visas, though hardly anyone seriously believes that the citizens of Ukraine and Belarus are a threat to European security. At the same time, neither the officials sabotaging reform, but with diplomatic passports, nor corrupt officials who buy property and business in the EU have difficulties with visas. Illegal migrant workers from the countries of the Eastern Partnership appear to have all left (visa regime did not become a hindrance), so the EU should not be afraid of the new flow, especially given the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the east. But the majority of law-abiding citizens of the EaP countries have not seen with their own eyes what can be achieved by conducting the reforms recommended by the European Union.

In addition to the increased use of incentives and motivators, available to the EU, the Eastern Partnership pragmatism should also include a more proactive media stance -- in fact, it is the media that form the view on the EU values with majority of the residents of the neighboring countries. Russian propaganda has spared no money and efforts to distort both the idea of ​​the European values, and the goals of the reforms recommended by the EU.

If the EU really intends to make the Neighborhood Policy more effective - it needs to focus more on people rather than the ruling regimes. You can negotiate with the latter, but the focus should be not the regimes, but people - they will ultimately determine the course of events, which was once again confirmed by the events of recent years.

Maksym Khylko, Head of the Board at East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, specially for charter97.org

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