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Serhiy Solodkiy: If Ukraine did not resist, Russia would have had half of it

Serhiy Solodkiy: If Ukraine did not resist, Russia would have had half of it
Serhiy Solodkiy

Today, at stake is not just the future of Ukraine, but global security and reputation of the West in general.

According to Deputy Director of Ukrainian Institute of World Policy Serhiy Solodkiy, Russia is not observing the Minsk agreements, and the separatists constantly shell positions of the Ukrainian military,

In an interview with charter97.org, the expert said Russia has something to hide in the occupied areas -- this territory is littered with Russian military equipment, while Ukraine remains committed to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At the same time, any compromise has its limits, the expert said.

- What kind of action can we expect from Kyiv in solving the eastern Ukraine issue?

- Ukraine cannot do more of what it does and has done. We have always insisted on a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Russia. But the agreements reached in Minsk in September last year have been thwarted by Moscow henchmen, who held a pseudo election in November (one month before the stipulated period, outside of the legal field of Ukraine). The agreements reached in February this year have been automatically frustrated - Russian puppets again want to hold local elections regardless of the Ukrainian legislation, without the OSCE observers.

Immediately after the signing of the last agreement in Minsk, separatists, supported by Russia, occupied Debaltseve. This attack best demonstrated Moscow's readiness to move towards peace. Every day Ukrainian soldiers are fired at about hundred times from the occupied areas. As a result of the militant attacks, in only five months the so-called truce 164 Ukrainian soldiers were killed, nearly a thousand were injured. Most importantly, Russia does not allow Ukraine to resume control of the border - and that is a section of 300 km. Moreover, Russia would not allow the OSCE representatives access some of the border posts. Clearly, Russia has something to hide -- the occupied areas are littered with Russian military equipment...

At the same time Ukraine has been and remains committed to a peaceful settlement, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to compromise, but there are limits to any compromise. In this case, this boundary is the country's sovereignty. Russia's goal is to create a quasi-state in Ukraine, which could block the development of the country; in fact, destroy the state from within.

Putin failed to mangle the state through his subversive groups. Now he is doing it within the framework of a diplomatic solution. His goal is for the 3% of the total territory of Ukraine to dictate Putin's agenda nationwide. In Ukraine, it was all quiet, there never arose any conflict on the basis of language, ethnic origin - until the green men came, girkins and borodays...

- What role could supply of the lethal weapon to the Ukrainian army from overseas play in the conflict?

- A huge one. Such deliveries is a kind of demonstration of political solidarity of the key players in the world and Ukraine. When in the early 1990s Ukraine gave up one of the most powerful in the world nuclear arsenals, the world's leading states gave assurances to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

The debate over the provision of lethal weapon is humiliating - especially for the states which promised to help. Russia can be stopped, but at least some action needs to be taken. Ukraine basically gave up Crimea to Russia under global calls "not to yield to provocations." Ukraine did not succumb to provocations -- and what happened?

If Kyiv acted according to the same patterns in the case of another of Putin's plans - Novorossiya- Russia would already have half of Ukraine. The US, Britain, France, Germany must understand that today at stake is not just the future of Ukraine, but global security, the reputation of the West in general. Otherwise, Washington should not be surprised if over time it turns out that Iran decided to acquire nuclear weapons...

- What are the current movements within the Ukrainian establishment on getting the state out of war?

- There are no particular currents and differences. The fairy tales about the parties of war and peace were made up by the press. There is a common understanding that Russia is the aggressor, that Ukraine will have to resist it for a long time without serious support from outside; that the problem of separatism in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova will be solved as soon as more responsible politicians come to power in Russia. At the same time there is also a general understanding that the country needs urgent reforms yielding quick results.

- How would you evaluate the government's work in Ukraine today?

- The main mistake of the government is indecision. And in this the current government is somewhat similar to their predecessors. The main advantage of the government is that the ministers listen to the civil sector, to civil society. And in this the current ministers are very different from their counterparts in the past. This allows us to believe that sooner or later changes will come.

The problem is that the main deficit of Ukraine today is time. In Ukraine, unfortunately, not everyone has realized the threat the country is facing.

- What can you say about the international context in which the Ukrainian authorities have to act?

- Of course, support could be more substantial. A year ago, the West had the fashionable idea of the so-called Marshall Plan for Ukraine – today they forgot about it. Sanctions against Russia were introduced by the Western governments with a visible delay - when nothing could be changed.

But everything is relative. Take, for example, Russia's war against Georgia in 2008: the West's support was enough for no more that six months. Promises of the Americans to exclude Russia from the Group of Eight remained only promises - until 2014, when Russia launched a new military operation. We can recall the Transnistrian conflict. The United States and the European Union showed, to put it mildly, just a fragmentary interest in the issue. Against this background, support for Ukraine can be called unprecedented.

The European Union acts with one voice in support of Ukraine - although even a year ago, most observers predicted that European solidarity would not last even until the end of 2014. Within half the year in the media appeared hundreds of accusatory publications that the West was about to strike an agreement with Russia behind the Ukraine's back. Putin, however, became even more outcast. They said that the West would be so much into the Islamist threat or internal problems that Ukraine would soon disappear from the radar of their interest. Ukraine still remains on the agenda of the most influential states. Albeit belatedly, albeit in limited quantities, but help is coming.

- Are the existing sanctions against Russia enough and how effective are they? Could further sanctions influence the actions of Russia in the east of Ukraine?

- They will be effective when Russia changes its policy towards Ukraine, when Moscow stops imposing "brotherly love" with the help of bayonets. Perhaps, in the short term, the sanctions will not achieve their goal, but that does not mean that they were not needed at all. We can only guess how far Russia would go if it was not for the current amount of sanctions.

But the main sanction, the main punishment for Putin is a successful Ukraine. This, in turn, is only possible with successive steps to contain Russia and with the continued support of the country (expert, financial, political).

- How would you describe the position of the EU and the United States with regard to Ukraine?

- Both the EU and the United States understand that Ukraine cannot be left alone with an aggressive Russia. Not only in terms of commitments that Washington, Paris, London gave more than twenty years ago, but also in terms of potential threats of both direct and indirect nature.

Direct threats are as follows: the EU fears escalation of the situation on its borders (this is fraught with at least humanitarian, economic issues). Indirect - if Ukraine is left without support, the process of nuclear disarmament would be no longer viable. Both the EU and the US are trying to help Ukraine - each according to their ability and desire. Numerous experts have arrived in Kyiv to support reforms, Ukraine regularly receives multi million assistance. But, of course, the level of support is not commensurate with the challenges faced by the country.

- Did the Ukrainian authorities manage to cope with the Russian propaganda, and what is the mood throughout Ukraine in regard to Russia? Is it only the negative or are there still supporters of rapprochement?

- Ukrainians have always been in favor of friendly relations with their neighbors. But when a neighbor bursts into your house, burglarizing it, killing people, it is not worth a brass farthing. It was not Ukraine that put its troops, unmarked, into the neighboring territory, it did not hold a pseudo referendum on the territory of another state, Ukraine did not send to the neighbor its thugs, drunk with false propaganda.

Ukrainians treat Russia as it deserves. If there is a different policy on the part of Russia, the attitude will also change. Do all Ukrainians share this opinion? Most of them do. Obviously, there are people with different opinions, for whom the treachery of Russia is an advantage (because they allegedly managed to cheat Ukrops and Pindoses). It is on them that Putin pins his main hopes when trying to implement the project Novorossiya.

However, Russia was wrong: Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are not necessarily supporters Putin's policies. A survey last August showed that 75% of Ukrainians have a negative opinion about the Russian president. I think that today this figure would be even higher. Ukraine does not really have to struggle with the Russian propaganda, people see the truth. Unlike the Russians, who were forced to trust the picture on TV screen, the Ukrainians were able to compare the image and reality.

The most revealing in this issue for me was the phone call in December 2013 of a relative of mine, a pensioner, who always sympathized with Russia, she had nostalgia for Soviet times, always watched the Russian First Channel. Then I got a call, a frightened revelation: "But they all lie!". I think no one has done so much in Ukraine to fight the Russian propaganda as the Russian propaganda itself. If there was no Dmitry Kiselev, he should have been invented to show the vileness, meanness of the Russian television. Now it is more important to fight with the Russian propaganda outside Ukraine.

- How strong is the pro-European and pro-NATO sentiment among the Ukrainians?

- It has never been stronger. Support for the country's integration into NATO is shared by 50% of the citizens; for accession to the EU - by more than 60% of Ukrainians. Previously, many Ukrainians feared that the country's integration into NATO could lead to Russia's aggression. Events of the past year showed that it was non-alignment that awakened territorial appetites of the Kremlin.

- What do you think about the current position of Belarus and Lukashenka's rhetoric in connection with Ukraine?

- Earlier, there was a nonexpert opinion that existence of Lukashenka is beneficial for Putin: on his background, Putin looks like a true democrat. Today, it seems, a new vision is formed: Lukashenka the dictator is not as terrible as Putin the aggressor. Ukraine is important for Belarus from trade and economic point of view, that's why Lukashenka has to rush - support Ukraine and then play along with Russia. His logic is clear: not to endanger Belarus, and first of all - himself. Belarus is not perceived in Ukraine as an enemy, but also the friendship seems weak, insincere.

- What can we expect in the near future in terms of developments in Ukraine and in the war zone?

- It depends, on the whole, on the three factors: first - the unity of the political elites, consolidation of society; second - the support of the West; third - the scale of the Russian activity to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. The worst scenario is if politicians campaigning for the democratic development of Ukraine quarrel, if society gets filled with apathy, if the West refocuses attention, if Russia switches to open hostilities...

There is a threat of the worst-case scenario. But the theory has repeatedly misled observers in the past year and a half: no one believed in the second revolution in Ukraine in 2013; no one believed that the days of Yanukovych were numbered; it also seemed that Putin's army could be stopped by no one and nothing... Ukrainians have no choice but to go against all the worst predictions and prove once again that Ukraine is a successful, strong state.

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