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Free Belarus and stable Ukraine - together in Europe

Free Belarus and stable Ukraine - together in Europe

The success or failure of European integration of Ukraine will significantly affect the fate of Belarus.

Article by Maksym Khylko, well-known Ukrainian analyst, Board Director of the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, specially for charter97.org:

Ukraine and Belarus - the success and the failure of the EU Eastern policy

Ukraine is currently a major success story of the European policy of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Belarus is for now its greatest failure. Not as easily and quickly as we would like, but Kyiv is moving on the path of the European integration. Even though the Association Agreement and that of the free trade zone with the EU was not signed from the first time, even though Chisinau overtook Kyiv in obtaining a visa-free regime, and Tbilisi is ahead in the implementation of some reforms -- yet it is an indisputable fact that it was the European integration choice of the Ukrainian people that changed the situation in the region.

At the same time, since the launch of the EP, the lack of progress in Belarus has been the most significant failure of this project. Although no progress in democratization was noted in Azerbaijan and a roll-back was noted in Armenia, both countries are outside the geographical limits of Europe, while Belarus is geographically, historically and mentally a European country. However, seven years of the Eastern Partnership have not been able to change the paradoxical situation of Belarus which remains the only European country to have an anti-European policy.

Brotherly nations parted ways?

Ukrainians and Belarusians are two neighboring nations that have so much in common in history, culture and mentality that they can be in fact called brotherly nations. The Kievan Rus, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rzeczpospolita -- for hundreds of years, Ukrainians and Belarusians lived together in large Eastern European countries. Later, the two nations came under the influence of Moscow which tried long but in vain to erase their identity and make them forget their native language and culture. In the revolutionary years of the early twentieth century, Ukrainians and Belarusians attempted to gain independence but fell under the blows of the Bolshevik armies.

In July 1990, the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and BSSR proclaimed state sovereignty, in August 1991 -- independence. On December 8, 1991 Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders -- Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich -- together with Boris Yeltsin signed the Bialowieza agreement fixing the collapse of the USSR.

In the first years of independence, Ukraine and Belarus also had a lot in common -- disorderly and confused "reforms", embezzlement of state property, impoverishment of the people, presidential elections in the summer of 1994. But Ukrainians then elected their second president, while Belarus- - the first one and, as it turned out, the only one so far.

We started going our own ways. Though it is difficult to suspect Leonid Kuchma in anti-Moscow sentiment, he,at least understood that Ukraine is not Russia. Balancing between Moscow and the West was not the best policy, but it still left a chance for the Ukrainian people to make a civilizational choice and defend it first in 2004 and again in 2013-14.

From the start, Alexander Lukashenko left Belarusians without the opportunity to choose, imposing unidirectional policy and conducting Russification policies with speeds which would make even the Soviet ideologists of the "common people" envious. During the years of the Lukashenko style "independence" the number of Belarusians speaking their mother tongue declined substantially; hearts and minds were left at the disposal of the Kremlin propaganda.

The fate of 9.5 million people on the altar of power lust

The European democracy, which provides for regular changes of people in power through free elections, seemed an unacceptable option for the Belarusian dictator who aimed at life-long reign. Freezing of relations with the EU and the United States limited the inflow of investment, credit and technology. Moscow, however, demanded that Belarus paid for subsidies and loans with its independence, getting it in big and small "portions" in all spheres -- politics, security, energy, finance, industry...

With the failure of hopes to lead not only Belarus, but also the Russian Federation in 1996-99 Lukashenko and Yeltsin signed a number of agreements on the establishment of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Soon, however, Russia was headed by Vladimir Putin, who was not against taking control of all the post-Soviet space. In 2000, Alexander Lukashenko received a "consolation prize" in the post of the Chairman of the Supreme State Council (SSC) of the Union State, but all the real levers of influence, of course, were in the Kremlin.

The price for the actual ceremonial post of President of the SSC was, among other things, the granting to Russia a possibility to place its troops on the territory of Belarus in the framework of the Regional Group of Forces of Belarus and the Russian Federation, created by the decision of the same SSC in 2000. To protect the "common" air borders, the Russian fighters we put on combat duty in the territory of Belarus already in 2013. Therefore, the ostentatious opposition of Lukashenko to Putin's plans to create in Belarus a Russian military airbase should be regarded as a mixture of trade with the grandstand game.

Recent military undertakings of Putin put the Belarusian people before a real danger of being drawn in the completely unwanted for them military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, Russia and the West. Ukrainian events have also shown that Moscow is ready to send troops into the territory of "brotherly" countries without hesitation, if it considers it necessary in the context of an imaginary war against NATO. Having common borders with NATO members particularly "loved" in the Kremlin -- Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, Belarus may appeal to Moscow as a convenient springboard for armed provocations, especially in the absence of certainty about who has more real impact on the Belarusian law enforcement agencies -- Lukashenko or Vladimir Putin.

Illusory drift of Minsk from Moscow

Falling oil prices and economic sanctions have significantly reduced financial possibilities of Kremlin to subsidize the loyal Minsk ally. Therefore, it is quite possible that Moscow secretly authorized a certain flashy foreign policy drift of Minsk to the side -- with a view to temporarily shift to the West a part of the financial burden for the maintenance of the Belarusian economy. Russia, leading a demonstrative sanctions war with the European Union, finds it convenient from time to time to turn a blind eye on the flow of "gray imports", supplying the popular goods through Belarusian customs.

Another reason for the Kremlin to sanction the "new" foreign policy of Minsk lies in the increase in the foreign policy maneuver capabilities. After all, it is much easier to negotiate a settlement of the conflict with Ukraine on a "neutral" territory like Minsk, than it is in Geneva.

For Minsk, in the conditions of the shrinking Russian economy, the ability to play independence is not just a chance to get Western loans for mending holes in the economy and keeping minimum social standards as a necessary support any authoritarian rule. It is also a chance to break the isolation, give the regime the appearance of international legitimacy and to cut the ground from under the feet of the opposition.

Conformist policies of the European Union

The economic crisis and the fear of the repetition of the "Crimean scenario" in Belarus forces Lukashenko to quickly expand the geography of foreign contacts. In such circumstances, the European Union would find it much easier to put forward conditions to Minsk than it did a couple of years ago, when Lukashenko had enough subsidies from Moscow. However, instead of forming a pragmatic but a solid policy of gradual return of Belarus to democracy, the EU chose to repeat the mistake with Lukashenko previously committed with Viktor Yanukovych -- for fear of losing Ukraine, the EU was ready to turn a blind eye to the usurpation of power, curtailment of democracy and dominance of banditry.

After the regular pseudo-presidential election held in Belarus in October 2015, the European Union, first suspended and in February 2016 finally lifted sanctions against 170 Belarusian officials (including Lukashenko). Minsk hosted frequent visits of EU officials, statements about the "positive trend" in Belarus began to be heard. But in fact the only positive event was the release of six political prisoners -- the same gestures of "good will" were demonstrated in his time by Viktor Yanukovych, which did not stop him later from giving the order to shoot people at Euromaidan.

EU leaders would really like to believe that concessions to Minsk will make it possible to avoid the deployment of Russian troops on the western borders of Belarus, which would increase the already high risks for the Eastern European countries of NATO. This completely overlooked factor of illusory sovereignty of Minsk, not able to stop Putin from placing in Belarus the number of soldiers and equipment that he considers necessary. Probably, some decisions of this kind were adopted at the Minsk session of the Supreme State Council of the "Union state" on February 26, 2016. Of course, formally, it will be presented as a defense of the "common" borderlines, losing sight of the fact that Belarus, unlike the Russian Federation, is in no confrontation with either NATO or the EU.

An important role in the formation of the new EU approach to Belarus is played by European businesses, which lost momentum as a result of mutual European-Russian sanctions and are hoping to partially return to the market of the Russian Federation through Belarus, using the re-export and joint ventures.

In fact, only a democratic and sovereign Belarus may be key to the eastern borders of the EU security and a factor for effective economic cooperation. Lukashenko cannot give such guarantees, even if he wanted to -- he is too dependent on the Kremlin and gave up too much sovereignty to Moscow. Unfounded assurances of security and temporary "gray" business schemes to avoid sanctions is all that Europe can get from the current regime in Minsk. Whether such "benefits" are worth the strategic losses is the question to the European capitals.

Financial aid in exchange for democratic reforms

In its approach to Minsk, the EU needs not only to make concessions in exchange for empty promises, but a real action plan for the democratization of the country is the appropriate changes in legislation, the freedom of political activity and the media, formation of a credible composition of the Central Election Commission, holding free and fair elections with the participation of international observers. Only a real democratization plan is to become the basis for new loans and deeper economic cooperation. Peaceful change of power is the best scenario for the Belarusian people, for the European Union, and for Lukashenko, even though he, like most dictators, does not want to understand it. Flirting with the dictator gives him false hopes to stay in power for many years to come.

Ukrainian example and the future of the Eastern Partnership

To contribute to the establishment of Belarus on the path of democratization the EU can actively help Ukraine become a positive example for the fraternal Belarusian people. The choice of Ukrainians in favor of the Association and free trade zone with the European Union is already a success for the EU Eastern policy and the Eastern Partnership. But the signing of the agreement is not enough. The main thing is the success of the reforms and a real improvement in living standards of Ukrainian citizens.

Yes, it is hard to help reform the country, whose economy is undermined by the war, where corruption continues to flourish, and the majority of the politicians still consider power as a means of enrichment. However, it would be unfair not to recognize that even in the current environment Ukraine continues to move towards the implementation of the Association Agreement -- a pretty impressive list of achievements for 2015 can be found in the respective government report, published February 23, 2016.

Of course, the progress could have been much greater, if the EU more actively helped Kyiv. And it is not only about a more adequate financial assistance to tackle the current problems. Opinion polls show that Ukrainian citizens expect from the EU not only money, but a more active involvement in Ukrainian affairs, and even pressure on the authorities in matters of reform. We are not talking about interfering in the internal affairs or making "homework" for Kyiv. Just do not forget that the Association is a joint creation and joint responsibility, and we need to work on it together.

After all, European leaders do not consider it shameful to exert political pressure on the Ukrainian authorities, requiring virtually unilateral implementation of the Minsk Agreements, in particular, to hold elections in the occupied territories without having the withdrawal of Russian troops. Why, when there is a need for clearer and more involved position on issues of reform and the fight against corruption, there begins the policy of non-intervention, bordering on the "washing of hands"? Do not forget about the moral responsibility of the European Union for failing to anticipate the aggressive reaction of Russia to its eastern policy and that but for pro Russian illusions of some leading European capitals, Ukraine would already have been in NATO and would have avoided the Russian invasion.

The inadequate EU support of Ukraine is even more surprising, because the future of the Eastern Partnership in the long run depends on Kyiv. The failure of the reform in Ukraine would finally discredit the EaP in the eyes of the countries in the region, giving a fertile ground for the Kremlin propaganda. Conversely, the successful, reformed Ukraine will become a contagious example for other East European nations, primarily for Belarusians and Russians. Not concessions to the dictators, but a more proactive position in supporting the reform and civil society, as well as a good example of success in Ukraine, are what you need for productivity of both the Eastern Partnership and the eastern policy of the EU as a whole.

Maksym Khylko, Board Director of the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, specially for charter97.org:

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