Putin’s Neighborhood Watch :: Charter'97 :: News

Russian meddling in Ukraine’s election is not an anomaly, but part of Moscow’s broader strategy to reassert control over its former domain.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is not suffering from dioxin poisoning like the disfigured president-elect of Ukraine, but he is increasingly becoming the ugly face of post-Soviet politics. U.S.-Russian relations are now at their lowest point since the fractious U.N. Security Council debate over the war in Iraq. Moscow feels that the White House is interfering in its “near abroad” by demanding a fresh election, while the United States thinks that Russia is blatantly interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs. But recent events in Russia’s neighborhood reveal that the West should not have been surprised by Putin’s unsubtle attempts to flip the Ukrainian elections: Those orange ties should have come out of the closet a while ago.

Consider how Russia dealt with the recent elections in Abkhazia, a breakaway province of Georgia that is not recognized by the international community. Abkhazian voters went to the polls on October 3, in the province’s first contested presidential election. The Putin-backed candidate, Raul Zhadzhinba, lost. How did Moscow respond? It refused to recognize the result. Then the Russian government shut down its rail link with Abkhazia (the province’s economic lifeline) and threatened to intervene if the election crisis, which Russia itself had created, was not resolved. On December 6, days before his planned inauguration, President-elect Sergei Bagapsh agreed to a new election in which the two rival candidates would run on a joint ticket, with Putin’s man in the number two slot. Due to Abkhazia’s uncertain international status, the West was silent about Putin’s exercise in intimidation and blackmail.

In Belarus, another part of Russia’s near abroad, Putin has turned a blind eye to electoral irregularities so that the man sometimes characterized in the West as “Europe’s last dictator” can remain in power. In October, Aleksandr Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, held a referendum to lift the two-term limit on the presidency. The official results showed that more than 77 percent of the public backed Lukashenko’s measure. But, as in Ukraine, the exit poll told a different story: It reported that just under half of the electorate wanted Lukashenko to run for a third term. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s election monitors concluded that “democratic principles were largely disregarded by the authorities.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, though, described the referendum as “calm and transparent.” Russia and Belarus clearly share the same view on how elections should be conducted. Belarus has joined Russia in complaining about the West’s intervention in Ukraine.
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There are few signs that events in Ukraine have cooled Russia’s desire to reassert its power in the near abroad. On December 9, a draft law was introduced in the Russian parliament to lay the legal groundwork for absorbing secessionist regions into the Russian Federation. The bill—which covers the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Dniester region of Moldova—has already won support from two parties in the Duma. And Putin is making his preferences known for elections elsewhere in Russia’s neighborhood, having all but endorsed the opposition candidate in Moldova’s presidential election, scheduled for February 2005.

Even after Viktor Yushchenko is inagurated, Putin will likely get what he wants. Yushchenko will have to tread carefully to avoid stirring up secessionist tendencies in pro-Russian eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the West—keen to preserve Russian cooperation in the war on terror—will urge Yushchenko to avoid rattling the cage of the Russian bear.

Putin will only cease his interference in the near abroad when it no longer serves his purposes. The recent events in Ukraine, Belarus, and Abkhazia demonstrate that even when he doesn’t get exactly what he wants, his meddling still guarantees Russia’s dominance in the region.

James G. Forsyth is assistant editor at FOREIGN POLICY