Flawed Elections … and Parties :: Charter'97 :: News

How Belarus` opposition parties, already under attack from the governing regime, squandered their meager chances to score even symbolic gains in January`s local elections.

Two major conclusions can be drawn from the local elections held in Belarus on 14 January. The first is obvious: President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has engineered another manipulated and flawed contest. The refusal to include any real opposition representation on election commissions, spurious rejection of many democrats’ attempts to register as candidates, intimidation of campaign figures, routine denial of permission for opposition election events, the alteration of election laws, and the refusal to produce campaign materials, combined to insure that yet another election in Belarus would not be free, fair, or transparent. Germany, as holder of the European Union Presidency, and EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, were quick to confirm this.

However, the regime’s violations of its own election laws, blatant repression and cynical ploys against democrats, as well as the pre-determined outcome of many of the contests, should not obscure what was also a striking failure of the opposition. After all, it was only a little more than a year ago when the opposition largely united behind a single candidate and worked on his behalf prior to the March 2006 presidential election. The result was the best-ever performance by an opposition candidate and a real campaign that resonated with significant parts of society. It is important to recall that, in those days, as protest rallies decried the manipulation of the election, the opposition United Democratic Forces (UDF) promised to stay and work together as a coalition to maintain and build on this momentum, and use the January 2007 local elections as another opportunity to reach out to citizens and offer an alternative vision for Belarus.

Sadly, there has been little realization of this sound approach. In the interim, the UDF’s leaders seemed more interested in fighting amongst each other for the coalition’s top position. Anatoly Lebedko, leader of the United Civic Party (UCP), and Sergei Kaliakin, leader of the Belarusian Party of Communists (BPK), clearly envied the domestic and international successes of the UDF’s elected leader, Alyaksandr Milinkevich, and they worked both with each other and separately to undermine his position. Specifically, internal wrangling over the question of whether to hold a new opposition congress, its eventual scope, realignments within the coalition, such as the formation of a “Left Union,” and internal party struggles, most notably in the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), proved to be more absorbing and satisfying than a genuine united effort to build on the March gains by reaching out to local voters, formulating a common strategy, and taking advantage of breaking issues, such as the Russia-Belarus “gas war” and a new EU strategy for Belarus. As a result, there was, again, no common effort. As Ales Uladamirski put it on the website of the independent news agency BelaPAN, “the opposition failed to put into practice their key ideas for the elections – one team, one message, one campaign.”

In fact, there was depressingly little effort at all. Finding activists willing to run proved difficult. While the regime did ratchet up its repression to intimidate possible candidates, the dearth of those brave or committed enough to challenge the powers that be was glaring. Even the opposition’s initial claim of 1,000 possible candidates was discouraging, as this hopeful figure amounted to a tiny fraction of those competing for 24,000 open seats.

MUDDLED TACTICS

Following the registration process, which was also manipulated by the regime, opposition political party figures (about 200) accounted for only about 1 percent of all registered candidates. By election day, the survivors found themselves very lonely indeed. Representatives of opposition political parties appearing on ballots totaled barely 100 names (the number of pro-democratic independents is unknown). In the end, the regime didn’t need to do much falsifying: with an average of 1.05 candidates per seat, very few races featured any competition at all. This was a markedly worse effort than in the previous local elections in 2003, when the BPK alone fielded more than 300 candidates and won over 130 seats. In fact, more than 180 pro-democratic party candidates were elected four years ago.

Few though they were, opposition politicians elected in 2003 were able to raise important issues, hold diverse events, and assist democratic forces in their local communities. Perhaps most importantly, they were the local human face of an otherwise fragmented democratic opposition that is rarely seen or heard in Lukashenka’s dictatorship. These local councilors were the only opposition figures within the state’s power structures. And, as the regular harassment directed against them indicated, many proved to be a thorn in the regime’s side.

So what happened this time around? Many opposition figures indicated that they would run, but then weren’t motivated enough to form initiative groups or teams to collect signatures. Milinkevich complained that many opposition candidates with plenty of experience made little effort or proved unable to comply with simple requirements.

Rather than trying to make the most of a difficult situation, parties couldn’t make up their minds whether to participate or not. One foreign observer and former Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe election-monitor, noted that “the opposition as a whole is relatively apathetic towards the elections with many opposition leaders only half engaged in the campaign.” One faction of the Social Democratic Party and the Belarusian Party of Communists, advised their candidates to pull out because of the regime’s violations of electoral rules and practices – as if they had expected something different.

Lebedko, who is also a leader of the UDF, declared that the opposition movement should not boycott the elections and offer the regime a “cakewalk,” but then pulled out himself. His attempt to clarify the opposition’s position – “there is no strict order to boycott but only a soft recommendation” – just muddled things. At a 4 January meeting, only 10 days before the elections, the political council of the UDF was still not sure whether its candidates should remain in their races. After telling a group of Western donors that candidates who resigned would betray their supporters, Viktar Karnienka, Milinkevich’s right hand, withdrew just days before the polls opened. In the end, regardless of their party leaderships’ recommendations, some candidates from each opposition party took part and others did not. Even pulling out of the elections couldn’t be coordinated by the opposition. This apathy, indecisiveness, and duplicity insured that the opposition would make no waves during these elections.

What about those candidates who did make an effort? Well, it seemed that many of those democrats elected in 2003, as well as those running this time around, made opposition leaders in Minsk almost as uncomfortable as they did the regime. This was particularly true for the Belarusian Popular Front: many of its candidates from the regions were in conflict with key elements of the party leadership and, in turn, were not supported by them.

As if these internal conflicts weren’t enough, a generation gap between many of the local candidates, who came of political age during and after the 2003 elections, and Minsk party leaders, a majority who belong to the generation of the 1996 Supreme Soviet, also reared its head. Finally, party leaders devoted most of their time to their own Minsk races, despite knowing full well that the regime would never allow them to win. These conflicts help to explain why local candidates received so little support from their Minsk leaders.

In terms of the leadership, Milinkevich’s performance was the best of a poor lot. While he did squander much time, energy, and good will by spending six months in Minsk fighting with the UDF leadership rather than the regime, Milinkevich began trying to do the right thing in the late autumn. Despite running one of the best campaigns of the 2004 parliamentary elections, he was one of very few opposition leaders who chose not to run himself this time around. He at least made an effort to assist those who were trying to fulfill the promises and ideals of March. By serving on initiative groups, collecting signatures, and visiting more than 40 cities and towns in all six regions of the country despite constant harassment by the regime, Milinkevich proved to be the only leader who worked on behalf of candidates from all opposition parties, as well as independents. By acting as a real leader, taking the opposition’s message to the people, and working on an inclusive basis, Milinkevich managed to preserve some of the UDF’s honor.

Despite their agreement to work collectively for the opposition coalition, most other leaders spent the majority of their time in Minsk and traveled only to work on behalf of their own parties. It was a sad return to the disastrous 2004 parliamentary elections, in which party leaders put individual interests above the common good by not dividing districts, not working together, and running democratic candidates against each other.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS

The 2007 elections demonstrate once again that not enough work has been done by political parties to build and strengthen local structures throughout the country. Of course, the regime has done its part to limit party development. In the three years between independence and Lukashenka`s coming to power, parties played a far more prominent role on the political scene. The first two parliaments were dominated by parties, but since then Lukashenka has worked to discredit the idea and practice of party politics. Beginning with his 1994 presidential campaign, Lukashenka has disparaged parties of all shapes and forms. Prior to these elections, “Europe’s last dictator” declared that he wanted non-partisan, non-politicized, and non-vocal local deputies and elections, which produced stability and quiet. The regime had already done much to reduce “factionalism.” Beginning in 2005, it dissolved the opposition Belarusian Party of Labor, helped competing factions of Social Democrats to cripple each other, and seems to be planning a similar fate for the BPK (the country`s other, more traditional Communist party is in the presidential camp).

The regime’s strategy has been to kick local party branches out of their office space, deny them legal addresses, and then question whether the national organization meets the state-mandated requirements to be legally recognized as a party. Opposition parties have had their offices raided, seen their materials confiscated, been attacked in the state-controlled media, had their leaders imprisoned, and been blocked from doing the kinds of activities that parties do, such as holding meetings with the public. Political parties are so weak that, of 23,791 candidates registered for the 2007 elections, only 535 were from parties, including those loyal to the regime. And the situation is getting worse: in 2003, 693 party candidates were registered and 257 were elected.

But opposition leaders themselves have also contributed to the slow death of party structures in Belarus. Perhaps the March, 2006 events reinforced their belief that only Minsk matters. In addition to the split in the Popular Front, the Social Democratic movement is in disarray. Since 2003 the party has split repeatedly and its factions have become increasingly irrelevant. Despite its leader Alyaksandr Kazulin’s strong impact on last year`s presidential elections, the decision of one faction, Belarusian Social Democratic Party “Hramada,” to remain outside of the United Democratic Forces and to compete as a “third force,” even with its leader in prison, has hurt the party badly. Less than a year after Kazulin’s dramatic March moments, the party fielded less than 20 candidates. While a couple of “Hramada” and Belarusian Party of Communists candidates were elected, the left as a whole performed poorly, which is why it is now banking on a new “Left Union.”

As Milinkevich pointed out, the 2007 election campaigns also reflected a certain lack of commitment on the opposition’s part. Center-right parties were on course to do better this time around, in certain respects. According to official statistics, more candidates from the Popular Front and the United Civic Party were registered in 2007 than in 2003. Both parties should have benefited from a close association with Milinkevich, who is nearer to them in ideology and outlook than he is to the left. But in contrast to four years ago, a significant number of Popular Front and United Civic Party candidates pulled out before the election, for no good reason, 60 of the 100 Popular Front candidates registered, for instance. Looking back on it all, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that many opposition activists did not participate or withdrew their candidacy because of weak structures and lack of will.

DESPERATE, DEMORALIZED, AND MARGINALIZED

It is not only the Belarusians who should be blamed. Too many European and U.S. organizations working on election-related programs have repeated far too often that “there are no longer real elections in Belarus.” This attitude lets Belarusian partners off the hook. Similarly to the 2004 parliamentary election debacle, in which pro-democratic parties also promised to work together and not to run candidates against each other, Western organizations are not holding their Belarusian partners accountable for promises made and then broken.

The local and regional coalitions put together by Belarusians and supported by several donors offered some of the few bright spots of the elections. Composed of parties, independent civil-society organizations, and trade unions, these coalitions were broad-based and included activists who had worked together for years. The concord and common efforts of these local coalitions differed remarkably from that of the Minsk leadership. Non-governmental organizations, for example, collected many, if not the majority, of signatures for local party candidates, and did much of the campaigning that did take place. In places such as Marina Gorka, Garadok, Belazarsk, and Vilejka, experienced representatives from civil society, political parties, independent trade unions, and independent publications had worked together with the public for several years. But unlike in 2003, the regime was smarter about focusing on these civil-society “hot spots.” And, according to media monitoring efforts, independent local media proved much less willing to cover any aspect of these elections than four years ago. Nevertheless, the best campaigns of 2007 were still carried out by similar groupings. In Masty, for example, a coalition of independent organizations, led by party and civil-society activists, played a key role in getting opposition candidates elected. A similar strategy helped many of the 20 or so opposition candidates who were elected.

After 14 January, it is sobering to reread a Belarusian journalist`s analysis of the opposition’s problems highlighted by the 2003 local elections. Back then, Alyaksandr Klaskouski believed that the opposition was neither psychologically nor organizationally prepared for elections.

"The election campaign reflected problems that have been long known – the weakness of the political opposition, underdevelopment of its regional networks, its alienation from the people and its notorious lack of unity," Klaskouski wrote. "The opposition failed to agree even on the division of Minsk constituencies so as to avoid rivalry between democratic candidates."

If the past is any indication, the future does not look very bright. One clear sign of the desperation, demoralization, and marginalization of the political parties is the snap decision by the UDF’s political council to hold an opposition congress in mid-March. While a new congress could serve as a venue to acknowledge recent mistakes made and pull together, as the October 2005 gathering did, it seems much more likely to be the site of a bitter leadership struggle which will further erode the credibility of parties and the opposition as a whole.

One result of botching even the limited opportunities offered by the 2007 local elections is that the democratic opposition is likely to become even more isolated from citizens. The leader of the Popular Front, Vincuk Viachorka, admitted that it would be much harder to reach out to the public after the campaigns. But he did a poor job explaining why almost half of his parties’ candidates forfeited the chance to connect with citizens by withdrawing from their contests. While the elections turned out to be a “formality” – in his words – for both the regime and the opposition, they weren’t planned that way by the opposition. With no elections in the immediate future, the opposition has few other opportunities for making its case to the public, with the exception of street protests. As the regime’s election-related machinations mounted, Viachorka and others declared that the main objective of the opposition’s participation in the local campaigns was to “encourage people to take part in spring protests.” Given the performance of the opposition over the past few months, one has to wonder whether anyone got the message.

Rodger Potocki is director for Europe and Eurasia at the U.S.-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Several TOL projects are supported by NED.

The article was published in “Transitions Online” on February 5, 2007