About Presidential elections

Traditionally, the Belarusian opposition uses the presidential election campaigns as an opportunity for heightened political activity.

The interim period between elections is a time for preparation, coalition forming, and planning strategy. Since the first presidential elections of 1994, there have been three further votes, in 2001, 2006, and 2010. In each case, the opposition generally failed to make a serious impression on the electorate, although there were some positives. But the question why the efforts to change the authoritarian leadership have thus far been unsuccessful has been a topic of serious debate among both politicians and analysts alike.

To begin, the term “opposition,” as deployed by the authorities is derogatory. It portrays its opponents as an amorphous group that wishes to break the contract between the president and the electorate or operates as some sort of subversive agency in the pay of foreigners, or else operating largely beyond the confines of Belarus—the fact that such exile is largely enforced notwithstanding. Elections in Belarus do not take place according to European or democratic standards. In the administrative-command system in place since 1996, there is no such concept as a viable and positive opposition. Rather it is marginalized, repressed, harassed, intimidated, and forced to operate on the periphery of society. That statement also applies to former officials who served in the regime and later opposed it. Not a single one plays a prominent role today.

Writing in Issue 3, 2013, of The Bell, Pavel Usov maintains that the problems of the opposition have been in place since 1994, most notably a lack of strategy and the failure to create a single and stable political front. He cites as the main reasons the personal ambitions of the leaders, their authoritarian culture and management style and, not least, their longevity as leaders of their respective parties. Admittedly, he writes, they have been isolated from the public by the regime, infiltrated by the security forces, and subjected to repressions, but he believes that there is a necessity to remove what he terms “self-compromised individuals” who lack moral values. He also comments that outsiders cannot artificially impose such leaders on the population—the impetus must come from within the country.

Another analyst, Zmicier Kukhlei (Зьміцер Кухлей), states that political parties in Belarus are essentially obsolete and that even pro-presidential parties like Belaia Rus have no role to play under the current system. Although there have been some negotiations between the various groups for a unified candidate—the BNF, Movement for Freedom, and Speak the Truth working together on the one hand, and the United Civic Party and Christian Democrats on the other—he thinks a coalition leader may be more viable than a single voice from the democratic forces, whose interests differ widely. He also considers that past examples from the late 1980s central Europe demonstrate the important role of insiders, former allies of authoritarian rulers. Similarly, BNF leader Aliaksei Yanukevich has declared that there will be no unified candidate in 2015, but nonetheless the parties need to cooperate and defend the independence of the country from Russian-dominated privatization of key industries.

Analyst Aliaksandr Klaskouski sees some opportunities given the exhaustion of the current ruling political model, and disillusionment with the “charismatic leader.” In his view, the Speak the Truth movement has been effective when taking part in protests against ambitious construction projects and the Chinese Industrial Park. He also notes the importance of cultivating the support of the large segment in society that supports neither the president nor the opposition—other analysts have referred to this group as the “pragmatists”—and feels hat the opposition might lose the 2015 elections but could still produce an effective new leader to take part in dialogue with the regime.

One potential and past candidate, Aliaksandr Milinkevich, appears to be on the same wavelength. He notes that to the population, salaries, social security, and fairness are more important than abstract notions such as democracy and freedom, and that in 2015 the program is more important than the personality. But he also stresses some “abstract” issues, such as Belarusian culture, and a European orientation, noting that Russia has its own interests in Belarusian elections, directed at controlling and weakening the Belarusian leadership. He maintains that the European Union could assist by introducing a visa-waiver program that would immediately change local attitudes to the west. Although a Soviet mentality persists in Belarus, he feels, it is notably weakening and this process needs to be accelerated.

According to IISEPS polls (cited by Kukhlei), about 50% of the population is opposed to the concentration of power in the hands of the president, and the country has not eradicated its economic dilemmas. Thus there is some reason for optimism. Perhaps the essential issue is that the 2015 elections are not a contest but an opportunity to engage with society and work toward the undermining of what some have called a Soviet identity. Further, as author Victor Cha wrote with regard to North Korea, the most vulnerable time for a dictatorship is not during periods of deep economic decline, but amid partial recovery, when the state is seen to be impeding progress. Thus a clear and comprehensible program for economic reforms as an alternative to the stop-and-start state plans, which lack conviction, is a necessity.

(to be continued)

David Marples, for charter97.org