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Laurynas Kasčiūnas: Kremlin needs half a year to oust Lukashenka

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Laurynas Kasčiūnas: Kremlin needs half a year to oust Lukashenka
LAURYNAS KASČIŪNAS

The Belarusian dictator is in fact a Russian governor, the Lithuanian political analyst believes.

A Lithuanian political analyst Laurynas Kasčiūnas is certain that the ongoing dialogue of the Belarusian regime with the West, attempts to normalize relations with it are just a front, since as soon as the West lays down conditions, which could contradict the fundamental principles of the regime, the entire dialogue will be wound up.

As for the relations of Belarus and Russia, as said by the political analyst, “Lukashenka is a rather independent president of a subject state.”

Besides, in an interview to charter97.org he noted that in the military sphere Belarus had lost its independence a long time ago, and taking into account the expanded presence of the NATO in the countries of the region one could expect even greater military integration of Belarus and Russia.

What is your assessment of the situation faced by Belarus now? It is trying to be a platform of the peace talks the between Kyiv and separatists (or Ukraine and Russia, to be more exact), and at the same time it needs to maintain good relations with the Kremlin, and simultaneously the authorities of Belarus are flirting with Europe. How the situation could be put simply?

Assessing the situation, there is nothing new in Belarus for 3-4 years. Lukashenka still has a strong position, as he is supported by Russia, he is subsidized by gas prices and by other credits and discounted prices. That is why all these games with the West, Europe, the country’s new “engagement”, “new relations”, new “normalization” are just a front, as they are needed by Lukashenka in essence as leverage for negotiations in the relations with Russia, for instance.

He is connected with Russia structurally, and the keys to a political transformation of his system are in Russia. And Europe should clearly understand that any attempt of Lukashenka to play a new wave in the relations is damned, as Lukashenka is going to play to a certain limit – in other words, until it agrees with the general architecture of his security policy, relations with Russia, as a guarantor of his political regime’s stability. The EU, acting in accordance with the principle more for more, at some stage is going to offer certain things which could contradict the basis of Lukashenka’s regime.

I want to say that Lukashenka is a rather independent president in a subject state. It sounds in an interesting way. Another analogy, which is possible in this case – a Russian governor with lots of room for manoeuvre. As I see the present day Belarus and what is happening, it has is its certain pathway. I do not think that it could break away out of Russia’s control on the systemic level. Breaking away would also mean that the country rejects the instruments which are keeping up viability of Belarus and the current regime. And as for Russia, some people may dislike Lukashenka, but the situation is, he is the best of the worst they have, that is why they tolerate him.

As the situation in Ukraine develops, as positioning of the NATO forces next to Belarus, in the Baltic States, is discussed, how could it influence the military cooperation of Belarus and Russia?

I will answer in a simple way. Just from the moment when people were beginning to talk about creation of the union state of Belarus and Russia (this project could be criticized and so on), it was exactly the military, defence sphere where these two countries reached the level when the Belarusian military structure was not technically functioning as an independent one, and works as a part of the Russian military forces. And the place of decision making, the button, is not inside Belarus in most cases. Especially in the matter of the air force, though not all sectors are integrated, but basically it is the most integrated sphere of the two countries. What is happening in connection with building up of the NATO military presence in the Baltic States, is to act as a catalyst, which is not exactly provoking, but could make Russia reinforce its military sector and the potential of Belarus to increase integration into the Russian system of security.

I do not think that in the military sphere Belarus would be able to act as an independent object. So positioning the NATO forces near Belarus could be just a pretext for an even greater military integration of Belarus and Russia.

Why the EU is “buying into” a thaw in the relations with Lukashenka once again? It is clear that “the election” is coming, but what hopes do Europeans, and even Americans, have, who met with Lukashenka as we have seen?..

It is very difficult to speak about the level of this “engagement”. I do not think that the West is of the opinion that with Lukashenka it would be able to drag Belarus away from Russia’s a sphere of influence.

Now we can see that even the question of political prisoners is not raised by the West as a priority any more…

I agree that there is a certain devaluation of conditions. But the sanctions are still in power, they have not been revoked. There are some contacts, some signals of a warm-up, but I think that common sense is dominating in the West that one cannot play with Belarus as with as a country which is balancing between the West and the East, it is in the East all the same.

It is possible that the West has not realized that this “engagement” is being sold. Maybe they do not fully understand how Belarus is working and functioning. Maybe they want to free some space for maneuver, to reduce their dependence on Russia. It is possible. This is guesswork.

But I do not think that the West hopes to be able to break the geopolitical course of Lukashenka. And there is only a game with Russia in his course, nothing more. I would not say that the West is seriously thinking about Belarus’ “engagement”, but is looking for a certain channel for a dialogue, is addressing some pragmatic issues and so on.

In such a case, how the upcoming “election” should be reacted to? Lukashenka is overusing the Ukrainian events…

Yes, and he has entrenched his positions, by symbolizing order and stability.

He has completely eradicated any possible opposition. What could be expected from this “election”?

What could be expected… Another farce of rigging the election results for extending his term for a few more years is expected. That’s all. This time, as never before, no turning point is expected at all, it is scarcely in sight, there are even no scenarios for the Square and so on. Grassroots movements are not even discussed. So nothing should be expected.

One should expect another farce, probably less demonstrative. It is possible that they would try to play a game of pluralism, to show struggle, that there is rivalry. They would not make a mistake as 5 years ago, to support one person, not to have a stalemate with the West for 5 years. The authorities will be looking for a way to show that there is a kind of pluralism. But it is just a façade certainly. And structurally, one does not feel that the Belarusian society now could become a driving force of changes from within and grassroots reforms. I do not think do.

As “the election” is approaching, Lukashenka has more and more breadth in his behavior, he permits himself hard words about Russia. He criticizes it, treats the occupied Crimea in the same way as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Could the Kremlin get tired of that, and what consequences it could have?

Consequences… If there would be ones, the Kremlin needs half a year or a year to oust Lukashenka. To raise gas prices to market ones, at least to the level of the price for the Baltic States, and Lukashenka’s system would collapse. But knowing the rules of the game, as I have said, they suppose that there is no other, better variant to this point. And it could be said a lot, it could be said loudly that Lukashenka is the most favorable political player for them. And it seems to me that at the moment Russia needs Lukashenka. The Kremlin already knows him.

What Lithuania should do with such a neighbour under the circumstances?

Lithuania should decrease its dependence on such neighbours. To diversify trade…

But on the contrary, we see that in connection with the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, on the contrary, Lithuanian business is coming to Belarus very actively…

It is not good. It is not the best moment, the business becomes a hostage of the regime and could start serving it as an agent of this regime in some way. One should analyze properly, where business is politicized and where it is not. And try to decrease dependence, and do not think that “engagement” could result in some structural changes in this state. Possibly, contacts should be minimized to the economic cooperation, where Belarus could not do without us. It is possible it would be enough.

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