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The Driving Force Of The European Eastern Policy

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The Driving Force Of The European Eastern Policy
Maksym Khylko
Photo: charter97.org

The willingness of the Visegrad countries to become the driving force of the EU’s Eastern policy will test the maturity of the Central European Quartet.

Visegrad Group is an example for the Eastern Partnership countries

Marked its twenty-fifth anniversary this year, Visegrad Group has special significance for the Eastern Partnership countries – it represents for them an opportunity to pass a long way of reforms in a short historical period of time. When Ukrainian officials complain that reforms cannot be carried out quickly, they are reminded of the experience of neighboring Poland, which GDP in 1991 was approximately equal to the Ukrainian one. However, at the time when Ukraine kept churning out oligarchs, Poland was implementing radical reform. When Kiev was entangled in the "multi-vector" policy, Warsaw had a clear course towards Europe.

The results are plain to see. As of 2013, the pre-war Ukrainian GDP was almost three times smaller than the Polish one, now - up to five times. Comparison of GDP per capita will be even more eloquent, not to mention the multiple wage gap. The same applies to other countries of the Visegrad Group and Eastern Partnership. For example, GDP performance in the Czech Republic is two and a half time higher than in Belarus, comparative country in terms of population. At the same time, the Czechs have managed to develop without discounted Russian gas, which Belarusians obtained at the expense of their strategic enterprises and independence.

Freed from the Moscow dictator in the 1980-90s, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks chose a course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration, announced it in the Visegrad Declaration of 1991 and always followed the chosen way. Slovaks only once (in the first half of 1990) yielded to the temptation of populism, but managed to realize the mistake on time and catch up.

Today the Visegrad Four (V-4) is a valuable example for the members of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), that clearly demonstrates what can be achieved over a decade of reforms aimed at European integration. Already in 1999, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic joined NATO. In 2004, Slovakia also joined NATO and entered the Quartet of the European Union. Thus, the citizens of V-4 countries have become a part of the strongest political, economic and military-political alliance in the world. At the same time, they do not have to sacrifice their freedom and identity in order to get the economic support and military security, as opposed to integration with Kremlin, which imposes corruption, authoritarianism and the “Russian ideology” in a single package with discounts on gas.

The experience of successful European Transformation of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks is debunked by the Russian propaganda that democracy and liberal economy contradict the very nature of the Slavs. In fact, exactly the opposite is the case – democratic and liberal values are very appropriate for the Slavs, as can be seen from the example of our neighboring Slavic peoples with languages and culture cognate to ours.

Of course, we are not going to idealize the Visegrad group. Their policy is not always coherent; moreover, after reaching the main objectives of the original association - entry into the EU and NATO - relationships within the V-4 lost momentum. Disagreements over such fundamental issues as sanctions against Russia and the development of energy cooperation with Moscow even gave rise to talks about the decline of V-4. However, recently the Visegrad countries have set out the goal to get more attention to their positions within the EU; and it will be easier to achieve together, especially in the context of the forthcoming presidency of Slovakia in the European Union.

The Russian factor is in the Visegrad countries

Freed after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the countries of the Visegrad Four rushed into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures - not least due to the desire to get away from Moscow and obtain sufficient guarantees of independence from the EU and NATO. They almost succeeded: the North Atlantic Alliance has provided military security and the EU has provided political and economic independence. Unlike the Eastern Partnership countries, still critically dependent on trade with Russia, Visegrad countries export only 3-5% to Russia. The share of imports from Russia is slightly higher - about 5-10%, and a significant portion of the figures is energy resources.

The persistently high level of energy dependency of the Visegrad countries on Russia (three-quarters of the oil and gas, and practically all nuclear power) does not allow to say that they were able to completely free themselves from Moscow, as energy for Kremlin – is not the goods but economic weapons that may "shoot" at any time. Such situation has happened in the cases of Belarus in 2004 and Ukraine in 2009, when Russia stopped gas supply at the peak of the heating season.

If the threat of termination of the energy supply to the Visegrad countries is still the hypothetical, the factor of using oil and gas as a tool of political corruption is a reality. However, this would also apply to many other EU countries. Scandals related to allegations of high-ranking officials and politicians in selfishly motivated lobbying for Russian oil and gas companies have been repeatedly erupting. Russian energy supply influences the foreign policy positions of individual representatives of European governments, in particular, affecting their attitude towards NATO, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the issue of sanctions, etc.

With Russian support, right- and left-wing radicals (also in the Visegrad countries) try to undermine the political situation and demand the government to take actions that are inconsistent with a consolidated course of the EU and NATO. The Russian propaganda actively works in the Visegrad countries, especially in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, getting into the television, press, Internet and "washing" brains of inhabitants with malicious statements and reports made by “petrodollar” pseudo-experts.

The Visegrad countries’ interest in successful neighbors

The Czech Republic is the only country in Visegrad group that has no common border with the Eastern Partnership countries. Hungary and Slovakia have common borders with Ukraine; Poland has extended lengths of borders with Ukraine and Belarus. Therefore, Visegrad countries are naturally interested in the successful development of the Eastern Partnership countries, especially Ukraine and Belarus. Moreover, V-4 naturally wish that their neighboring countries remained independent. In fact, no one - including Viktor Orban, Hungarian Prime Minister calling for the lifting of sanctions - wants to see Russian tanks at the borders.

Poland, an initiator of the Eastern Partnership policy, understandably focuses its attention on the support of neighboring Ukraine and Belarus. Warsaw serves as a “counsel” of Kiev in the European Union, actively lobbying for Ukraine's course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Poland unhesitatingly supported Kiev during the Russian aggression and now it stands for maintaining and even tightening of sanctions against Moscow. Poland has become a haven for many of the Belarusian opposition activists, forced to leave their homeland due to the political repressions under the Lukashenka's regime. Warsaw supports the functioning of the independent Belarusian mass media and public organizations, the Belarusian language and culture.

Bratislava has enthusiastically supported the launch of the Eastern Partnership. Although its political elite was not unanimous with regard to the accession of EaP countries to NATO, it supports their course towards European integration, providing them expert assistance in matters of economic and security reforms. Slovakia is actively developing horizontal relations on the level of civil society (NGOs, expert communities, scientific cooperation).

Poland, Slovakia and Hungary played a key role in providing gas to Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Having promptly adjusted reverse supplies, these countries deprived Kremlin of the possibility to turn off the gas in Ukraine, which allowed Kiev to buy gas on the European market and secure the relative energy freedom from Moscow.

As transit countries, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine oppose plans of Kremlin and its European business partners to build a gas pipeline “Nord Stream 2”, designed to be a tool of political pressure on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Support in the democratization, reformation and development of civil society in the Eastern Partnership countries is also provided by the International Visegrad Fund, founded in 2000 in order to promote the development of relations between the V-4 states and their representation in other countries. The Fund considers Eastern Partnership countries as a priority and supports their educational institutions, research centers, public organizations, individual citizens, provides grants and fellowships for scientific and cultural projects, exchange programs, cross-border cooperation, etc.

The EU’s misunderstanding of the Belarusian course

For many years, Visegrad countries have consistently criticized the regime of Lukashenko, demanding from him democratic reforms. However, with the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, they succumbed to the pan-European temptation to believe in his peacekeeping initiatives and “intentions” to preserve the independence of Belarus and cooperate with the European Union.

Despite the absence of democratic reforms in Minsk, or at least plans of reforms, in February 2016, the European Council decided to lift the sanctions from 170 people and 3 companies in Belarus. The formal reason was the release of six political prisoners, which looked like they were hostages of the regime released in exchange for “ransom”. The release of the political prisoners is an important event; however, there should be a plan that can protect Belarus from new arrests of dissidents, especially at a time when Minsk, being in need of loans, can be more compliant.

Nevertheless, no real progress was observed in the matters of democratization on the basis of European officials’ visits to Minsk. There are only talks about non-binding readiness of Belarusian authorities to “continue the dialogue” on the subject of human rights. In fact, in exchange for empty talks, Minsk receives real benefits - elimination of sanctions and restoration of economic cooperation.

Among the Minsk visitors, there were also political directors of the Foreign Ministries of the Visegrad countries, who have discussed the issues of cooperation and prospects for the normalization of relations between Belarus and the EU. The Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski visited Minsk as well. Alexander Lukashenko told him about the allegedly denial of the ex-Prime Minister Donald Tusk to take part in the peace talks on Ukraine. Although Lukashenko did not have the authority to extend the negotiation format, he managed to raise the issue for the internal political strife in Poland.

It is difficult to say whether the reason for the EU’s changed course of action is a genuine confusion about the intentions of the Lukashenko to get closer to the EU and prevent Putin to use the Belarusian territory for aggression against Ukraine, the EU and NATO. Or, probably, Europeans have decided that the stabilization of the situation in Belarus (but in fact - preservation of the current non-democratic regime) is an acceptable price to pay for the so-called “stability” and the ability to use Belarus as a smuggling hub for trade in sanctioned goods with Russia. Anyway, flirt with Moscow-dependent authoritarian regime without clear requirements on democratic reforms will not lead to anything good. And it will not give any real guarantees of security, because it is Russia who decides such issues for Belarus.

The success of the Eastern Partnership – is a European mission of the Visegrad Four

After the collapse of the socialist camp, countries of “old” Europe, primarily Germany, extended their helping hands to newly independent eastern neighbors - the Visegrad countries. Advisory and financial assistance in reforms implementation, multi-billion dollar investments and Western technologies have enabled Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to pass the most difficult part of the transformation path, obtain security guarantees and become full members of the Euro-Atlantic community of free nations.

Now it is the Visegrad countries’ turn to help their eastern neighbors in the process of democratic transformations and market reformation. Although the V-4 do not have such a powerful financial leverage, as, for example, Germany, they are quite capable of providing political, institutional and advisory support to the countries of Eastern Partnership. They can help with a transfer of experience of reformation of public administration, health, education and security sectors; fight against corruption, development of market economy confronted to EU standards, attraction of investments, development of independent media and civil society.

Visegrad Four can pass its valuable experience of the successful European integration on their eastern neighbours and help them along the way.

For the Vicegrad countries, it is a moral duty and European mission to help their neighbours by carrying forward the Eastern policy. The willingness of the Visegrad countries to become the driving force of the EU’s Eastern policy will test their maturity. Therefore, the Visegrad countries can be assed weather it is within their capabilities and level of responsibility to perform this mission. Vicegrad countries can also consider it as a possibility to prove that they are influential players on the European space.

Maksym Khylko, Chairman of the Board of East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, specially for charter97.org website

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