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Populist Backlash In V4 Countries: Lessons To Be Learned For Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia

Populist Backlash In V4 Countries: Lessons To Be Learned For Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia
Nelly Tomčíková

Since a revolutionary wave in the late 1980s in the Central Europe the V4 countries had been perceived as models of successful democratic transition.

Since a revolutionary wave in the late 1980s in the Central Europe the V4 countries had been perceived as models of successful democratic transition.

Yet, just two years after the Eastern enlargement they sank into the political crisis and have been suffering from electoral paralysis, and increased populist and nationalist maze. Since the first elections after the accession to the EU a new political order in the Central Europe with the political elites that encouraged illiberal sentiments started to grow.

After the years of pro-European cabinets, the after-accession election results in the Central Europe were in favour of national interests´ defenders bringing populism underpinned by nationalism and Euroscepticism back to politics. The V4 countries veered toward a new political order ruled by weak political elites and alienation of the society from them. Populism in Central (as well as Eastern) Europe, often placed within the right-wing, is considered to be rooted in the common (not only communist) traditions and history of these states.

The nature of populism and nationalism in the Central Europe is rather different form the one of the Western democracies. It is a heritage of the different historical experience and brings the residue of historical traditions of the nationalism in its train. Most of the Central European political movements in post-communist era emerged in the political system characterized: by concerns of the public about the right democratic transition of their post-communist country; by the voters more inclined to listen to the parties who represented those who had lost out as a result of democratic transition (such as Self-Defence in Poland led by Andrzej Lepper, the populist “actor” of the Slovak politics Vladimír Mečiar or right-wing Worker´s Party, former Republican Party, in the Czech Republic); by an anti-corruption and general anti-establishment attitude of the (populist) parties benefiting from the ideological war between the ruling elites (such as Smer in the late 1990s during the ideological war between Mečiar and his opponents); or by opposition to the EU accession (such as the far-right Jobbik party in Hungary).

When the euphoria after 1989 fizzled, the Central European elites who looked up to the Western democratic model as the one they wished to belong to, came to understand that the Western prototype of parliamentary democracy had flaws. The flaws such as lack of trust in democratic institutions, disenchantment with the political environment and the rise of populism. The velvet transitions to democracy were perceived as unfinished and failed and has been used in the rhetoric of the opposition against the ruling governments. Populism together with nationalism and Euroscepticism became a new political prism in the V4 countries.

The collapse of liberal political governments of the Central Europe that brought their countries in to the EU was followed by the political crisis. The joy from entry to the EU and omnipresent emphasizing of benefits from the membership came to a close, as did the era of pro-European governments. The political achievements of EU membership were overshadowed by social problems, alienation of the society from the ruling elites, the need for further reforms and economic hardship. The pro-Europeans political elites, whose main goal (accession to the EU) was completed, were not able to justify their agendas to frustrated voters anymore.

The passion for reforms, the concept of politics the pro-EU governments represented across the political spectrum was leaving with them. The need for agreement among the parties (social democrats, liberals and centre-right) and the desire to return back to Europe faded away. The consensus they shared was suddenly gone and instead of continuing in progress accomplished in democratic reforms and instead of continuing in cooperation across the political spectrum, the Central European parties decided to underpin one another´s intentions and failures. It was easier to spell the phrases as betrayal of the people or treason of the nation than to pursue further (unpopular) reforms.

After a decade of pro-European administrations, the V4 voters voted for parties that defend national interests. This nationalism “renascence” after EU integration led to the mass demonstrations against the cabinets in power. Paradoxically, the accession to the EU boosted the tendency to populism and Euroscepticism. Before the EU entry only few Eurosceptic parties were against the EU accession and even less of them would have dared to exasperate their voters who expressed their willingness to join the EU in referendum.

Once the EU membership was secured, the EU forfeited its legitimacy to mentor V4 countries. Moreover, when the European institutions started with forbidding appellations of some (Central European) products, it was easy to attract public attention and spit on the EU. Some opposition parties blamed the then ruling pro-European government for betraying the people by negotiating not very favourable conditions during pre-accession period (as the ODS (Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic) that brought attention of public to negative aspects of the Treaty of Accession).

The fruitful soil for populism in the Central Europe might be explained by pre-modern rurally based and religion-imbued traditionalism, and lower educated population which fears the political and economic transition of its country. It is argued that populism in the Central Europe is a legacy of the ideology and practice of communism as it is believed that remnant of communism is pessimism, passivity and weak moral values which are easy to endorse. For Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, the legacy of a shared totalitarian history keeps its influence on their democratic transition the same way it had for V4 Group.

It is more than likely to be expected that these post-communist countries have been (and will continue to) experienced similar wave of post-communism populism before and after the EU accession. However, although these countries share Central Europe’s communist history and legacy, as well as the will for reforms, nor Ukraine, neither Moldova and Georgia have mirrored the Central European successful political and democratic transformation.

More than twenty years after the democratic transition started and several years since the “coloured” revolutions happened, the political system in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia has remained unstable and fragile. In Ukraine, after the Orange Revolution human rights and civil liberties prospered, however as they were not anchored in legislative to be kept sustainable, they were easily violated when Viktor Yanukovych came to power in 2010. And just two years after Victor Yanukovych left and in light of public unrest with current state of Ukraine last year, political populism in Ukraine has been on the rise even more.

The Ukrainian political elites have been turning to populism in order to show their own truthfulness and folksiness. The rise of populism in Ukraine does not come, however, as a surprise as Ukraine has been ruled by oligarchs for years. Therefore, anti-oligarchic populism has fertile soil to grow as fighting the oligarchs is a popular phrase used by the political elites. Current rise of populism mirrors a kind of helplessness and despair of both the political parties in administration and opposition to find the answers on situation in the Eastern Ukraine.

In Moldova, a front runner of democratic reforms among these three countries, people started to lose their belief in European integration especially when the pro-European government was dissolved due to a result of rivalries between the coalition partners and gave a chance for the Communist party to strengthen. The feeling of disillusion with the last few years´ democratic transformation leads to the rise of populism, mainly from the Our Party of Renato Usatii who is now the most trusted Moldavian politicians.

A general crisis of leadership across these three countries, a serious disagreement between society and political elites and also the economic crisis for which the national governments are to blame, lead to the general feeling among Ukrainians, Moldavians and Georgians that their countries are heading in the wrong direction. A fight against corruption promised in every election which has never been kept is encouraging citizens to put their own survival and economic profit at the forefront. The anti-corruption measures used by the political elites (most of the time by the opposition) serve as a “theatre performance” for citizens in order to show the determination of ruling elites to fight corruption.

The Eastern European countries have experienced renewed populism and nationalism, and even authoritarianism (which Moldova has very tightly avoided in past few years, rather by coincidence than intentions). Therefore, any consensus on democratic and economic reforms of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia might be considered as more fragile than the one accomplished in V4 countries during their EU accession process.

What are the lessons to be learnt by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, then? First of all, all three countries should approach democratic reforms dutifully in order to be able to fulfil the EU requirements and conditions. The reforms will be undoubtedly though, parties will face dissatisfaction of the electorate and public polls will definitely reflect disagreement. However, the politicians should not reduce their willingness to push reforms and slid to populist accusations of each another. The EU accession should be kept as the universal attracting pole in the EaP countries regardless of political affiliation before and long after the entry. The EU entry should not be the end of this democratic long-distance race. And mainly, the pro-European camp should not fail to preserve consensus in their own ranks as the Central Europeans did.

Moreover, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova should secure more social democratic movements as those, in general, serve as stabilizing elements of young party systems, drawing voters away from populists, posing as mediators. The political parties (especially those that tend to populism) should avoid to cooperate with far-right and far-left extremists with little or no concern about the reaction from the international community. As the V4 countries were, the Eastern Europeans should not be willing to shed their reformist intentions by the national interests. After the accession to the EU these countries should avoid to slid toward unfavourable political system characterized by weak cabinets, polarized societies and tension at the borders. However, it is important to remember that the absence of pressure after they safely land in the EU and the absence of a political role model, could hurt the democratic consolidation of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia even greater than it did in V4 countries.

Nelly Tomčíková, Project Manager Prague European Summit, Czech Republic, specially for charter97.org

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